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Despite their distinct objects of study, the human behavioral sciences all include models of
individual human behavior. Unity in the behavioral sciences requires that there be a com-
mon underlying model of individual human behavior, specialized and enriched to meet the
particular needs of each discipline. Such unity does not exist, and cannot be easily attained,
since the various disciplines have incompatible models and disparate research methodolo-
gies. Yet recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for unity
in the behavioral sciences, incorporating core principles from all fields, and based upon the-
oretical tools (game theory and the rational actor model) and data gathering techniques
(experimental games in laboratory and field) that transcend disciplinary boundaries. This paper
sketches a set of principles aimed at fostering such a unity. They include: (a) evolutionary and
behavioral game theory provides a transdisciplinary lexicon for communication and model-
building; (b) the rational actor model, rooted in biology but developed in economic theo-
ry, applies to all the human behavioral disciplines. This model treats actions as instrumen-
tal towards satisfying preferences. However, the content of preferences must be empirically
determined. Moreover, the rational actor model is based on a notion of preference consis-
tency that is not universally satisfied, so its range of applicability must also be empirically deter-
mined; (c) controlled experiments have been underutilized in most behavioral disciplines.
Game theory and the rational actor model can be used as the basis for formulating, deploy-
ing, and analyzing data generated from controlled experiments with human subjects.
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Resumen. Hacia la unidad de las ciencias del comportamiento humano
A pesar de que tienen objetos de estudio distintos, todas las ciencias del comportamiento
humano cuentan con modelos de la conducta humana individual. La unidad de tales cien-
cias requiere un modelo común subyacente de comportamiento humano individual, espe-
cificado y enriquecido para satisfacer las necesidades particulares de cada disciplina. No exis-
te tal unidad, y no puede ser fácilmente alcanzada, dado que que las diversas disciplinas
tienen modelos incompatibles y metodologías de investigación dispares. Con todo, recientes
desarrollos teóricos y empíricos han creado las condiciones para la unidad de las ciencias
del comportamiento, incorporando principios centrales en todos los campos, y basándose en
herramientas teóricas (como la teoría de juegos y el modelo de actor racional) y técnicas de
recogida de datos (como los juegos experimentales de laboratorio y sobre el terreno) que
transcienden las fronteras disciplinarias. Tales desarrollos incluyen: (a) la teoría de juegos
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ción y la construcción de modelos; (b) el modelo de actor racional, anclado en la biología pero
desarrollado por la teoría económica, que se aplica en todas las disciplinas del comporta-
miento humano. Este modelo trata las acciones como instrumentales, dirigidas a la satis-
facción de las preferencias. Sin embargo, el contenido de las preferencias debe ser empíri-
camente determinado. Además, el modelo de actor racional está basado en una noción de la
consistencia de las preferencias que no se satisface universalmente, de modo que su rango
de aplicabillidad debe determinarse también empíricamente; (c) los experimentos controlados,
que han sido infrautilizados en la mayoría de las ciencias del comportamiento. La teoría de
juegos y el modelo de actor racional pueden ser usados como base para formular, desplegar
y analizar datos generados a partir de experimentos controlados con sujetos humanos.
Palabras clave: ciencias del comportamiento, teoría de juegos, economía experimental,
modelo de actor racional.
1. Introduction
The human behavioral sciences include economics, human biology, anthro-
pology, sociology, behavioral psychology, and political science1. We may con-
sider a set of disciplines as unified if they are (a) consistent, so that in cases
where two disciplines deal with the same social phenomena, their models are
equivalent, and synergic, each discipline being substantively enriched by the
scientific content of the others. The natural sciences achieved unity with
the development of quantum mechanics, elementary particle and solid state
physics, and the big bang model of the universe. Such unity is lacking in
the human behavioral sciences. Each behavioral discipline models individual
human behavior, and construct models of aggregate social behavior compati-
ble with, and often derived from, a model of individual behavior. Unity in the
human behavioral sciences requires a common underlying model of individual
behavior, which each discipline specializes and enriches for its particular pur-
poses. No current model enjoys such transdisciplinary status.
1. By «human biology» I mean the application of biological techniques to modeling human
behavior. I use the term «behavioral psychology» to mean social psychology and psycho-
logical decision theory.
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ciently deep to establish the preconditions for unity. Both sociology (Hechter
and Kanazawa, 1997) and political science (Monroe, 1991), following the pio-
neering contributions of Coleman (1990), Downs (1957), Olson (1965),
Buchanan and Tollison (1984) and others, have begun to adopt the rational
actor model, previously espoused virtually exclusively in economics. Game
theory, a central element of economic theory, was introduced to biology by
Lewontin (1961), Hamilton (1967) and Maynard Smith and Price (1973),
subsequently maturing into an invaluable behavioral tool (Alcock, 1993,
Dugatkin and Reeve, 1998, Gintis et al., 2001, Gintis, 2003a). In anthropol-
ogy, the application of experimental game theory to understanding cultural
variation is rather new, but quite promising (Henrich et al., 2001, Henrich et
al., 2004). Conversely, increasing numbers of economists develop behavioral
models of social interaction, and draw upon evidence from experimental game
theory in modeling behavior. This development is evidenced by the Nobel
prize in economics for the year 2002, awarded jointly to two experimental-
ists: psychologist Daniel Kahneman and economist Vernon Smith.
In this paper I will sketch a set of principles that express my current concep-
tion of unity. I will argue the following points: 
a. Game theory provides a transdisciplinary behavioral lexicon for commu-
nication and model-building. For many years it was widely thought that
game theory presupposes methodological individualism and a high level
of cognitive functioning on the part of subjects. Were this the case, game
theory would be inapplicable to settings where emotion, traditional, and
heuristic behaviors are prominent, and where group-level processes
and dynamic interactions are common. Contemporary evolutionary and
behavioral game theory, however, extends classical game theory to cover
such settings. 
b. Evolutionary biology underlies all behavioral disciplines because Homo
sapiens is an evolved species whose major characteristics are the product of
its particular evolutionary history. 
c. Evolutionary and behavioral game theory provides the substantive frame-
work for the biology of human behavior. 
d. The rational actor model, developed in economic theory, is a flexible tool
that applies to all the human behavioral disciplines. This model treats
actions as instrumental towards satisfying preferences. However, the con-
tent of preferences must be empirically determined, and individuals may
have preferences over actions as well as their outcomes. Moreover, the ratio-
nal actor model is based on a notion of preference consistency that is not
universally satisfied, so its range of applicability must also be empirically
determined. 
e. Progress in modeling human behavior has been hampered by the under-
utilization of controlled experiments, which are common only in behavioral
psychology. Game theory and the rational actor model can be used as the
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trolled experiments in social interaction. Such controlled experiments are
replicable across laboratories and foster cumulative knowledge relevant to
all behavioral disciplines. 
f. Progress in modeling human behavior has been hampered by the artifi-
cially restricted range of social situations studied by behavioral scientists. Only
anthropology has systematically studied the effects of cultural differences
across societies on human behavior, only sociology has systematically stud-
ied the effects of cultural differences within societies on human behavior,
and only behavioral psychology has systematically studied the effects of
personality differences on social interaction. A unified model of human
behavior is fostered by taking controlled experiments to the field, and
deploying such experiments in a variety of cross-cultural settings across
and within societies.
g. The demographic success of Homo sapiens is due to the ability of humans
to sustain a high level of cooperation among non-kin. Whereas biology
and economics explains this ability in terms of exchange among self-inter-
ested individuals, the facts are in line with basic sociology and behavioral
psychology: humans often display altruistically prosocial behavior, espe-
cially in a form that I will call strong reciprocity —a predisposition to coop-
erate and to punish non-cooperators at personal cost (Gintis et al., 2005).
h. Prosocial behavior in humans can be modeled biologically using the tools
of gene-culture coevolution, but the social mechanisms involved must
include using the sociological notions of socialization and the internaliza-
tion of norms.
Two caveats are in order. First, this set of unifying principles is incomplete
and highly subject to revision. In particular, I make no mention of neuro-
science or behavioral genetics. This is in part for lack of space, and in part
because the general interconnection between these and other parts of behavioral
science are unclear and our ideas thereupon are rapidly changing. Second, I
claim that each behavioral discipline has developed core principles that are
largely accurate, yet overlooked or denied by other disciplines. I do not assert
that the ones I discuss are the only core principles of the discipline, or even
the most important. Rather, they are principles central to the unity of the
human behavioral sciences.
2. Game Theory as Behavioral Lexicon
Communication across disciplines presupposes a common language. Game
theory is a universal behavioral lexicon that offers such a common language.
In the language of game theory, players (or agents) are endowed with a set of
available strategies, and have a range of information concerning the rules of the
game, the nature of the other players and their available strategies, as well as
the structure of payoffs. Finally, for each combination of strategy choices by
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If the game is accurately specified, we can predict the behavior of the 
players by assuming they attempt to maximize some preference function involv-
ing their personal payoffs, their chosen strategies, the personal payoffs to other
agents, and the actions of the other agents (Gintis, 2000). Self-regarding agents
maximize their personal payoffs, while other types of agents may care about
fairness, the intentions of other agents, the sum of all payoffs, their relative
personal payoff, and other aspects of the array of payoffs.
Developments within game theory in recent years have considerably
enhanced its value to behavioral disciplines that have traditionally found little
use for this analytical tool. First, it is now widely recognized that in many
social interactions, individuals are not self-regarding, but rather care about the
payoffs to and intentions of other players (Rabin, 1993, Bergstrom and Stark,
1993, Andreoni and Miller, 2002, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Wood, 2003).
Second, human actors care not only about material payoffs, but power, 
self-esteem, and behaving morally (Gintis, 2003b, Bowles and Gintis, 2005,
Wood, 2003), goals that are recognized as central to many behavioral disci-
plines. Third, evolutionary and behavioral game theory do not require the
extensive cognitive and information processing capacities of classical game
theory, so disciplines in which it is recognized that cognition is a scarce and
costly good can make use of game-theoretic models (Young, 1998, Gintis,
2000, Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). Thus, individuals may consider only a
restricted subset of strategies (Winter, 1971, Simon, 1972), and they may use
by rule-of-thumb heuristics rather than maximization techniques (Gigerenzer
and Selten, 2001). Game theory is thus a generalized schema that permits the
precise framing of meaningful empirical assertions, but imposes no particular
structure on the predicted behavior.
3. The Universality of the Rational Actor Model
The rational actor model assumes that individuals have preferences reflecting
their wants and the tradeoffs among these wants, and that individuals maxi-
mize their utility by choosing from an action set that is limited by available
information, material resources and time, cognitive capacity, and the agent’s
physical capacities. Choice is also contingent upon beliefs concerning the proba-
bilities of various states of nature, the frequency distribution of types of indi-
viduals with whom they interact, and the relative effectiveness of different
actions. The rational actor model is most highly developed in economics, but
it applies to all the disciplines dealing with human behavior.
The rational actor model appears prima facie to apply only when extreme-
ly stringent conditions are satisfied. However, the model can be shown to apply
over any domain in which the agent has transitive preferences, in the sense that
if he prefers A to B and he prefers B to C, then he prefers A to C, and the
agent can make tradeoffs among outcomes in the sense that for any finite set of
outcomes A1,…,An, if A1 is the least preferred and An the most preferred out-
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agent is indifferent between Ai and a lottery that pays A1 with probability pi and
pays An with probability 1-pi (Kreps, 1990). Clearly, these assumptions are
often extremely plausible. When applicable, the rational actor model’s transi-
tivity assumption strongly enhances explanatory power, even in areas that have
traditionally abjured the model (Coleman, 1990, Kollock, 1997, Hechter and
Kanazawa, 1997).
The rational actor model is ubiquitous because any evolved life form is like-
ly to conform to its consistency conditions over some range of actions. This is because
biological agents do not directly maximize fitness, but rather possess a genet-
ically-rooted set of routines, involving needs, drives, pleasures, and pains, that
determine how to respond to internal events (e.g., hunger) and external cir-
cumstances (e.g., temperature). This is precisely the agent’s preference func-
tion, which will thus be transitive so long as actual choices reflect biological
fitness, which is a linear variable. Evolutionary forces ensure that, under con-
stant environmental conditions, maximizing this preference function will in
fact come close to maximizing the agents’ fitness. Since environmental con-
ditions are not constant, however, preference consistency must always be empir-
ical demonstrated rather than assumed a priori.
The rational actor model has been underutilized in some behavioral dis-
ciplines through several prominent misunderstandings. First, the rational actor
model does not require that individuals be self-interested. There is no con-
nection between the notion of the transitivity of preferences and the notion
that preferences are purely self-regarding. Indeed, one can apply standard choice
theory, including the derivation of demand curves, plotting concave indiffer-
ence curves, and finding price elasticities, for such preferences as charitable
giving and punitive retribution (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). Second, because
the rational actor model treats action as instrumental towards achieving rewards,
it is often inferred that action itself cannot have reward value. This is an unwar-
ranted inference. For instance, the rational actor model can be used to explain
the expressive motivation in rational action, including collective action that
is precluded by the assumption that individuals act instrumentally towards
satisfying their material needs (Olson, 1965), since individuals may place pos-
itive value on the process of acquisition (for instance, «fighting for one’s rights»),
and can value punishing those who refuse to join in the collective action
(Moore, Jr., 1978, Wood, 2003). Third, the areas over which the transitivity
postulate holds must be empirically determined.
For example, consider the discount rate —the rate at which individuals are
willing to sacrifice present for future gains. In economics, «rationality» in the
form of consistency of preferences across time implies that individuals use
exponential discounting, in which the discount rate is constant across all peri-
ods. Assuming this consistency, the discount rate can be estimated empirical-
ly at about 3% per year (Huang and Litzenberger, 1988, Rogers, 1994). Animal
studies find that non-human species have discount rates that are several orders
of magnitude higher than this (Stephens et al., 2002). Humans and other ani-
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sent versus near-future are much higher than discount rates for similar time
periods starting in the more distant future (Herrnstein, 1961, Ainslie, 1975,
Ainslie and Haslam, 1992, Laibson, 1997). This finding corresponds to the
everyday notion that we are subject to «temptation» and «failure of will,»
leading us to accept high long term penalties for small short-term pleasures
(smoking, overeating, procrastinating). Formally, this means that preferences
are not transitive across time, and most observers of this phenomenon (includ-
ing the individuals who are subject to this inconsistency) agree that the ‘dis-
tant future’ discount rates more closely conform to the agent’s welfare.
Consonant with these findings, sociological theory stresses that impulse con-
trol —learning to favor long-term over short-term gains— is a major compo-
nent in the socialization of youth (Strotz, 1955, Ainslie, 1975, Power and
Chapieski, 1986, Grusec and Kuczynski, 1997). Time inconsistency does not
imply that the rational actor model be rejected, but we must include parame-
ters to deal analytically with preferences across time (Laibson, 1997).
Another misunderstanding is that embracing the rational actor model
entails equating well-being with preference satisfaction. If rational agents have
consistent preferences and are perfectly informed, such an inference may be
warranted, but these conditions do not always hold. In particular, if individ-
uals are excessively present-oriented (a major form of time inconsistency) then
their choices will not reflect their long-term well-being. The time-inconsis-
tent rational actor model may thus shed considerable light on such perverse
phenomena as procrastination, substance abuse, undersaving for old age, and
obesity (Elster, 1979, Akerlof, 1991, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001).
Broadening the rational actor model beyond its traditional form in neo-
classical economics run the risk of developing unverifiable and post hoc theo-
ries, as our ability to theorize outpaces our ability to test theories. To avoid
this, and following the lead of behavioral psychology, we must expand the use
of controlled experiments, as suggested above. Often we find that the appro-
priate experimental design can generate new data to distinguish among mod-
els that are equally powerful in explaining the existing data (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981, Kiyonari et al., 2000).
4. Biological Replicators
The analysis of living systems includes one analytical element that does not
occur in the non-living world, and is not analytically represented in the natural
sciences. This is the notion of a replicator (Schrödinger (1944) called this an
«aperiodic crystal»), which is a physical system capable of drawing energy from
its environment to make relatively accurate copies of itself. The dynamics of
replicators are described by the evolutionary notions of replication, mutation,
selection, and adaptation (Lewontin, 1974).
Biology plays a role in the behavioral sciences much like that of physics
in the natural sciences. Just as physics studies the elementary processes that
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cators. In particular, genetic replicators account for the characteristics of
species and their interactions, as well as their similarities and differences in
morphology, physiology, and behavior. Just as one cannot deduce the char-
acter of natural systems (e.g., the principles of inorganic and organic chem-
istry, the structure and history of the universe, robotics, plate tectonics) from
the basic laws of physics (e.g., quantum and statistical mechanics), similarly
one cannot deduce the structure and dynamics of social life from basic bio-
logical principles.
The most natural setting for replicator dynamics is game theoretic.
Replicators endow copies of themselves with a repertoire of strategic respons-
es to environmental conditions, including information concerning the con-
ditions under which each is to be deployed in response to character and den-
sity of competing replicators. Mutations included replacement of strategies by
modified strategies, and the «survival of the fittest» dynamic (formally called
a replicator dynamic) ensures that replicators with more successful strategies
replace those with less successful ones (Taylor and Jonker, 1978).
Classical population biology, throughout much of the Twentieth century,
did not employ a game-theoretic framework (Fisher, 1930, Haldane, 1932,
Wright, 1931). However, Moran (1964) showed that Fisher’s Fundamental
Theorem, which states that as long as there is positive genetic variance in a
population, fitness increases over time, is false when more than one genetic
locus is involved. Eshel and Feldman (1984) identified the problem with the
population genetic model in its abstraction from mutation. But how do we
attach a fitness value to a mutant? Eshel and Feldman (1984) suggested that pay-
offs be modeled game-theoretically on the phenotypic level, and a mutant gene
be associated with a strategy in the resulting game. With this assumption, they
showed that under some restrictive conditions, Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem
could be restored. Their results were generalized by Liberman (1988),
Hammerstein and Selten (1994), Hammerstein (1996), Eshel et al. (1998)
and others. Thus it turns out that at the most fundamental level of population biol-
ogy game theory is key to understanding evolutionary biology. Of course, game
theory has also become the basic framework for modeling animal behavior
(Maynard Smith, 1982, Alcock, 1993, Krebs and Davies, 1997).
5. Gene-Culture Coevolution
Genetic replicators transmit information encoded in DNA sequences, through
a germ line that is unaffected by environmental conditions. Genetic adapta-
tion to new environments then takes the form of shifts in allele frequencies,
and promotion of mutations that better exploit the new environment. In the
context of rapidly changing environments, there is a fitness benefit to the trans-
mission of epigenetic information concerning the current state of the environ-
ment. Such epigenetic information is quite common (Jablonka and Lamb,
1995), but achieves its highest and most flexible form in cultural transmission
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Richerson and Boyd, 1998).
There are several basic categories of culture: conventions (e.g., language
use), techniques and practices (e.g., how to prepare food, how to make and use
tools, how to treat illnesses), ethical values (e.g., norms of fairness, reciproci-
ty, justice) and transcendental beliefs (e.g., sickness is caused by angering the
gods, good deeds are rewarded in the afterlife). A transcendental belief is
the assertion of a causal relationship or a state of affairs that has a truth value,
but whose truth holders either cannot or choose not to test. There are of course
other types of beliefs, but these appear to be subsumable under other cultur-
al categories. For instance, one may believe that a certain convention exists, a
certain technique is effective, or a certain ethical value is justifiable. To avoid
confusion, we treat such beliefs as part of the conventions, techniques and
practices, and values that they affirm.
Conforming to conventions is adaptive because it is payoff-maximizing to
conform when all others are doing so. When an agent must determine the
most effective of several alternative techniques or practices, and if experimen-
tation is costly, it may be payoff-maximizing to copy others rather than incur
the costs of experimenting (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, Conlisk, 1988). If
everyone else experiments to find the superior technique, it will generally pay
simply to follow the majority. By contrast, if everyone else conforms to a sin-
gle technique in a situation where different techniques are best suited to different
environments, then when the environment changes an individual who exper-
iments may do better than the conformists. Thus, in general there will be a
cultural equilibrium with a positive fraction of both conformists and experi-
menters. In this sense, the genetic machinery for a predisposition to conform
to conventions and to imitate techniques is biologically adaptive.
It is plausible to extend this explanation to transcendental beliefs as well.
Such beliefs affirm techniques where the cost of experimentation is extreme-
ly high or infinite, and the cost of making errors is high as well. This is, in
effect, Blaise Pascal’s argument for the belief in God and the resolve to fol-
low His precepts. It is supported by Boyer (2001), who models religion as a
set of cognitive beliefs that coexist and interact with our other more mun-
dane and testable beliefs. In this view, one conforms to transcendental beliefs
because their truth value has been ascertained by others (relatives, ancestors,
prophets), and are as worthy of affirmation as the techniques and practices
(such as norms of personal hygiene, that one accepts on faith, without per-
sonal verification).
Conventions, techniques, and beliefs are instrumental in the sense that they
specify how best to achieve certain ends or goals. The remaining cultural cat-
egory, ethical norms and values, is final in the sense of specifying what ends or
goals to embrace. I discuss the place of cultural values in human behavioral
theory below.
Whether or not cultural elements are replicators in a sense closely parallel
to genetic replicators is the subject of much current controversy (Aunger, 2002)
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and across time, mutate, and are subject to selection according to their effects
on the fitness of their carriers (Parsons, 1964, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,
1982, Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Moreover, there are strong interactions
between genetic and epigenetic elements in human evolution, ranging from
basic physiology (e.g., the transformation of the organs of speech with the evo-
lution of language) to sophisticated social emotions (e.g., empathy, shame,
guilt, revenge-seeking). The analysis of the reciprocal action of genes and
culture is known as gene-culture coevolution (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981,
Durham, 1991, Feldman and Zhivotovsky, 1992, Bowles and Gintis, 2005).
6. Cooperation: Ethical Behavior or Self-interest?
The success of Homo sapiens, as measured by its broad geographical distribu-
tion and its considerable share of the Earth’s biomass, is based on its unique
capacity to use cultural forms to transmit technical knowledge accurately across
generations, and its unique ability to sustain cooperation through space and
across time among large numbers of unrelated individuals (Richerson and Boyd,
1998). How do we explain this cooperation?
Biologists maintain that cooperation can be sustained by inclusive fitness, or
cooperation among kin (Hamilton, 1963), and by individual self-interest in
the form of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). Reciprocal altruism occurs when
an agent helps another agent, at a fitness cost to itself, with the expectation
that the beneficiary will return the favor in a future period. The explanatory
power of inclusive fitness theory and reciprocal altruism convinced a genera-
tion of biologists that what appears to be altruism —personal sacrifice on
behalf of others— is really just long-run self-interest. Economics has devel-
oped a similar model of cooperation, based on the notion of long-term, enlight-
ened self-interest (Arrow and Debreu, 1954, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981,
Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986), an idea that goes back to Bernard Mandeville’s
concept of «private vices, public virtues» (1924[1705]) and Adam Smith’s
notion of the «invisible hand» (2000[1759]).
Sociology, by contrast, has used socialization to explain cooperation among
non-kin. According to Durkheim (1951), the division of labor in society
involves assigning individuals to specific roles. Individuals are inculcated with
values and norms that induce them to conform to the duties and obligations
of the role-positions they occupy. This is altruism.
A key tenet of socialization theory is that a society’s values are passed from
generation to generation through the internalization of norms (Durkheim,
1951, Benedict, 1934, Mead, 1963, Parsons, 1967, Grusec and Kuczynski,
1997). In the language of optimization theory, internalized norms are accept-
ed not as instruments towards and constraints upon achieving other ends, but
rather as arguments in the preference function that the individual maximizes.
Internalized norms are thus what we termed ethical values in our lexicon of
cultural forms. In true gene-culture coevolutionary form, a variety of unique-
Towards a Unity of the Human Behavioral Sciences Papers 80, 2006 107
Papers 80 001-312  13/12/06  10:52  Página 107ly human prosocial emotions come into play, including prominently shame,
guilt, and empathy, directly reinforcing internalized norms.
The programmability of the preference function appears in the form of
the human capacity to internalize norms, which consists in an older generation
instilling the values and objectives of a younger generation through an extend-
ed series of personal interactions, relying on a complex interplay of affect and
authority. Individuals conform to an internalized norm because so doing is an
end in itself, and not merely because of the material rewards that follow from
norm compliance or punishments that follow from norm violation. For instance,
an individual who has internalized the value of «speaking truthfully» will do so
even in some cases where the net payoff to speaking truthfully would other-
wise be negative. It follows that where people internalize a norm, the frequency
of its occurrence in the population will be higher than if people follow the
norm only instrumentally; i.e., when they perceive it to be in their narrow
material interest to do so. The capacity to internalize is based on a distinc-
tively human psychological predisposition, unrecognized in biology and eco-
nomics.
7. The Evolutionary Basis for Norm Internalization
An «altruistic norm,» when acted upon, reduces the bearer’s individual fitness
or material well-being, but increases the fitness or well-being of other, unre-
lated, group members. The internalization of altruistic norms appears to be
an evolutionary curiosum because individuals who internalize such norms
should be at a fitness disadvantage in comparison with self-interested actors. A
closer look at the cultural transmission process, however, offers a resolution
to this problem (Gintis, 2003a).
Suppose there is an altruistic behavior A that imposes fitness cost s on those
who embrace it. Suppose also that only a fraction of youth have the genetic
capacity to accept ethical norms, and this fraction increases or decreases over
time according to the biological fitness of its bearers. Suppose further that
altruistic behavior A is transmitted to offspring with this genetic capacity by their
parents in an unbiased manner (i.e., if both or neither parents embraces A, all
of their genetically enabled offspring do the same, and if only one parent
embraces A, half of such offspring embrace A). In addition, suppose there is
extraparental transmission of A, in the form of social pressure (rumor, shun-
ning, and ostracism), rituals (dancing, prayer, marriage, birth, and death), and
in modern societies, formalized institutions (schools, churches, sacred texts).
Such extraparental transmission is itself altruistic, since it will generally be
individually costly while the benefits, in the form of a higher frequency of
altruism in the group, accrue to unrelated others. We handle this, plausibly,
we believe, by assuming that the altruistic norm is both to embrace A and
to encourage others to embrace it as well, and we include the cost of extra-
parental transmission in s, the cost of altruism. We measure the strength of
extraparental transmission by a parameter γ, such that if the fraction of altruists
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istic child with the genetic capacity to acquire the altruistic norm, will in fact
be induced to embrace the altruistic norm.
Suppose, further, that an altruist who meets a non-altruist, which we assume
occurs with a probability proportional to the fraction of altruists, switches to
the nonaltruist’s behavior with probability α. Gintis (2003a) then shows that
if α satisfies the inequality
(1)
then the altruistic cultural equilibrium, in which all individuals have the gene-
tic capacity to embrace ethical norms, and all actually embrace A, is evolu-
tionarily stable. Note that (a) the larger the fitness cost s of altruism, and (b) the
smaller the rate γ of oblique transmission, the lower the maximal rate of «moral
defection» α to the nonaltruistic that is compatible with an altruistic cultural
equilibrium. Note also that if γ is sufficiently large (specifically, if γ > (1+s)/2)
then no rate of defection can undermine the altruistic equilibrium, because
individuals rarely meet nonaltruists with whom they can compare their fit-
ness.
The substantive questions, then, are (a) why γ might be positive and large,
and (b) why the rate α of moral defection might be low. To address (a), note
that the rate of extraparental transmission depends not only on the willing-
ness of individuals to sacrifice on behalf of the group by engaging in extra-
parental socialization and by rewarding others who do the same, but also on the
structure of social institutions that routinize cultural transmission. There is
thus no guarantee that γ will be high, but societies that do effectively organize
cultural transmission, and stress ethical norms that are heavily prosocial, will
tend to grow and otherwise outcompete societies that do not (this process is
referred to above as weak group-level selection).
To address (b), we must explain why individuals might not defect at a very
high rate to fitness-maximizing behavior. The following argument suggests
that the psychological constitution of Homo sapiens is conducive to a high rate
of adherence to moral norms, and hence to the satisfaction of equation (1).
While nearly everyone behaves amorally on some occasions, and some behave
amorally much of the time, there is normally a sufficient reserve of moral
behavior, including the motivation to punish the moral transgressions of oth-
ers, to maintain a high level of conformity with group morality.
As we have noted, humans do not maximize fitness, but rather a prefer-
ence function that is but a rough proxy for fitness under constant environ-
mental conditions. The rapid pace of environmental change and cultural inno-
vation over the past 100,000 years has produced a situation in which the set of
needs, desires, drives, pleasures, and pains associated with the human prefer-
ence function is out of line with the dictates of fitness maximization (Richerson
and Boyd, 1998). Even a random deviation of the human preference function
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and pleasure, might be conducive to a relatively slow rate of rejection of moral
norms, of which altruistic norms might figure prominently.
However, there is evidence of a more systematic force intervening between
biological fitness and human preferences: as we have seen, the human prefer-
ence function is, to some considerable extent programmable, in the sense that
human goals can be altered by socialization. The notion of a programmable
preference function is sufficiently unusual that such a mechanism must have
arisen as an adaptation, and hence the content of socialization, the actual inter-
nalized norms themselves, must be, at least on balance, fitness enhancing. Yet
standard sociological theory has not supplied an argument as to why it might
be adaptive, and indeed have generally ignored evolutionary arguments alto-
gether. We can, however, supply such an argument.
A programmable preference function is the most complex instrument facil-
itating epigenetic information flows, all of which represent means of transfer-
ring information across generations in a manner complementary to, and often
more flexible than, genetic transmission (Bonner, 1984; Boyd and Richerson,
1985; Jablonka and Lamb, 1995, 1998). The form that this epigenetic trans-
mission process takes in the case of the internalization of norms is a protract-
ed series of interactions, controlled by parents and influential elders, under-
taken at considerable cost, and reinforced by a complex web of informal
sanctions. While cultural learning occurs in many species, programmability
of goals is virtually limited to humans because the capacity to be socialized
presupposes a high level of cognitive capacity (Tomasello, 1999), as well as
specialized mental circuitry for valuing interpersonal relationships and mak-
ing informed social judgments (Damasio, 1994), and specialized emotional
capacities that enhance the individual’s capacity to attain internalized goals,
such as pride, shame, empathy, and remorse (Bowles and Gintis, 2005). The
genetic basis for prosocial emotions is clear from the fact that the inability to
experience prosocial emotions, associated with sociopathic personality types, is
partially heritable (Mealey, 1995), and is deficient in individuals with dam-
age to specific regions of the brain’s frontal lobes (Damasio, 1994).
The capacity to program changes in the preference function culturally
indeed has great adaptive value. By redirecting human goals, and thereby curb-
ing, repressing, and channeling an agent’s basic impulses, the agent will have
higher fitness than another agent who lacks this capacity. Included among the
norms that are commonly internalized are thus norms of personal hygiene,
concern for the approval of others, control of temptation, cultivation of a work
ethic, and maintaining a long time horizon in decision-making. Such norms are
upheld and transmitted in virtually all societies (Brown, 1991), though a break-
down of cultural transmission in this area occurs in some poorly functioning
societies (Edgerton, 1992).
For an example of the fitness-enhancing capacity of internalization, note
that a sophisticated weapon, such as a sharp knife, may aid an individual in
taking revenge upon a transgressor, but the spontaneous impulse to attack an
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However, parents can instill in their offspring the norms of «love thy neigh-
bor» and «be slow to anger.» Individuals who have acquired this genetic pre-
disposition to internalize norms will pass both this capacity and its content
—the conflict-limiting norm itself— to their offspring. For this reason, the
internalization of norms may be fitness-enhancing.
For a second example, suppose someone invents an aerodynamic spear that
is extremely effective in the hunt, but requires daily practice to hone the throw-
ing skills needed to use the spear effectively (Calvin, 1983). Since individuals
primordially prefer less expenditure of energy to more and have inappropri-
ately short time horizons, they will skimp on daily practice. The hunter who
internalizes the norm «good hunters like to practice» will have an adaptive
advantage.
One might object that a non-internalizer could always mimic the behavior
of internalizers when it suits his purposes, and do better by violating the norm
strategically when it is in his interest to do so. In fact, the noninternalizer could,
but will not want to emulate internalizers, in the sense that emulating their
behavior simply does not maximize his preference function. To pursue the first
example above, curbing one’s violent tendencies may improve fitness, but the
primordial preference function is not geared towards maximizing fitness, but
rather towards a set of «fitness proxies» that entail being violent under earlier
evolutionary but not contemporary circumstances. The noninternalizer will, of
course curb his violence for prudential reasons, but not, because he in addi-
tion values peace, his neighbor’s well-being, or even his biological fitness. In
the second example, the noninternalizer will prefer the larger portion of meat,
and the greater prestige that follows from a rigorous practice routine, but nev-
ertheless, not enough to engage in such a routine.
Once genes for norm internalization are in place, there is nothing pre-
venting altruistic norms from being culturally transmitted, internalized, and
acted on in the same manner as personally fitness-enhancing norms. Altruism
thus ‘hitchhikes’ on the personal fitness-enhancing capacity of norm inter-
nalization, and hence is an exaption, in the sense of Gould and Vrba (1981). It
is for this reason that the rate of defection from altruistic norms might be suf-
ficiently low that equation (1) might hold, as long as fitness costs are not too
high and there is some positive level of oblique transmission2.
It might be suggested that in a cultural equilibrium with internalized altru-
istic norms, a mutant family that teaches its children to internalize the per-
sonally fitness-enhancing norms but not the altruistic ones would out-com-
pete families that transmit both personally fitness-enhancing and altruistic
norms. However, if part of the ethic of altruism is to punish selfish types, even
2. By the same token, even antisocial norms can hitchhike on the internalization capacity,
and they not infrequently do just that (Edgerton 1992). We show in Gintis (2003a) that
the tendency of higher-fitness groups to out-compete lower fitness groups provides a strong
tendency towards the circumscription of anti-social norms.
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may have no adaptive advantage. Moreover, we show in Gintis (2003a) that,
using the above notation, if
(2)
selfish internalizers are positively disadvantaged with respect to altruistic inter-
nalizers.
8. Strong Reciprocity and Behavioral Game Theory
Recent experimental research supports the above synthesis3. We define strong
reciprocity as a predisposition to cooperate with others, and to punish those
who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implau-
sible to expect that these costs will be repaid.
8.1. Evidence from the Ultimatum Game
In the ultimatum game, under conditions of anonymity, two players are shown
a sum of money, say $10. One of the players, called the «proposer,» is instruct-
ed to offer any number of dollars, from $1 to $10, to the second player, who
is called the «responder.» The proposer can make only one offer. The respon-
der, again under conditions of anonymity, can either accept or reject this offer.
If the responder accepts the offer, the money is shared accordingly. If the
responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing.
Since the game is played only once and the players do not know each other’s
identity, a self-interested responder will accept any positive amount of money.
Knowing this, a self-interested proposer will offer the minimum possible
amount, $1, and this will be accepted. However, when actually played, the
self-interested outcome is never attained and never even approximated. In fact, as
many replications of this experiment have documented, under varying con-
ditions and with varying amounts of money, proposers routinely offer respon-
dents very substantial amounts (50% of the total generally being the modal
offer), and respondents frequently reject offers below 30% (Camerer and
Thaler, 1995, Güth and Tietz, 1990, Roth et al., 1991).
The ultimatum game has been played around the world, but mostly with
university students. We find a great deal of individual variability. For instance,
in all of the above experiments a significant fraction of subjects (about a quar-
ter, typically) behave in a self-interested manner. But, among student subjects,
average performance is strikingly uniform from country to country.
3. This material is developed in Gintis, Bowles, Boys and Fehr (2003).
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imental subjects, Joseph Henrich, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, Colin Camerer,
Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Richard McElreath (2001) undertook a large
cross-cultural study of behavior in various games including the ultimatum
game. Twelve experienced field researchers, working in twelve countries on
four continents, recruited subjects from fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting
a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. These societies consisted
of three foraging groups (the Hadza of East Africa, the Au and Gnau of Papua
New Guinea, and the Lamalera of Indonesia), six slash-and-burn horticultur-
ists (the Aché, Machiguenga, Quichua, and Achuar of South America, and
the Tsimané and Orma of East Africa), four nomadic herding groups (the
Turguud, Mongols, and Kazakhs of Central Asia, and the Sangu of East Africa)
and two sedentary, small-scale agricultural societies (the Mapuche of South
America and Zimbabwe farmers in Africa).
We can summarize our results as follows. 
a. The canonical model of self-interested behavior is not supported in any
society studied. In the ultimatum game, for example, in all societies either
respondents, or proposers, or both, behaved in a reciprocal manner. 
b. There is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had
been found in previous cross-cultural research. While mean ultimatum
game offers in experiments with student subjects are typically between
43% and 48%, the mean offers from proposers in our sample ranged
from 26% to 58%. While modal ultimatum game offers are consistently
50% among university students, sample modes with these data ranged
from 15% to 50%. In some groups rejections were extremely rare, even
in the presence of very low offers, while in others, rejection rates were sub-
stantial, including frequent rejections of hyper-fair offers (i.e. offers above
50%). By contrast, the most common behavior for the Machiguenga
was to offer zero. The mean offer was 22%. The Aché and Tsimané dis-
tributions resemble American distributions, but with very low rejection
rates. The Orma and Huinca (non-Mapuche Chileans living among the
Mapuche) have modal offers near the center of the distribution, but
show secondary peaks at full cooperation. 
c. Differences among societies in «market integration» and «cooperation in pro-
duction» explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation between
groups: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the
payoffs to cooperation, the greater the level of cooperation and sharing
in experimental games. The societies were rank-ordered in five categories
—«market integration» (how often do people buy and sell, or work for a
wage), «cooperation in production» (is production collective or individual),
plus «anonymity» (how prevalent are anonymous roles and transactions),
«privacy» (how easily can people keep their activities secret), and «com-
plexity» (how much centralized decision-making occurs above the level
of the household). Using statistical regression analysis, only the first two
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significant, and they together accounted for 66% of the variation among
societies in mean ultimatum game offers. 
d. Individual-level economic and demographic variables did not explain behav-
ior either within or across groups. 
e. The nature and degree of cooperation and punishment in the experiments
was generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these
societies.
In a number of cases the parallels between experimental game play and the
structure of daily life were quite striking. Nor was this relationship lost on
the subjects themselves. Here are some examples.
a. The Orma immediately recognized that the public goods game was simi-
lar to the harambee, a locally-initiated contribution that households make
when a community decides to construct a road or school. They dubbed
the experiment «the harambee game» and gave generously (mean 58% with
25% maximal contributors). 
b. Among the Au and Gnau, many proposers offered more than half the pie,
and many of these «hyper-fair» offers were rejected! This reflects the
Melanesian culture of status-seeking through gift giving. Making a large
gift is a bid for social dominance in everyday life in these societies, and
rejecting the gift is a rejection of being subordinate. 
c. Among the whale hunting Lamalera, 63% of the proposers in the ultima-
tum game divided the pie equally, and most of those who did not, offered
more than 50% (the mean offer was 57%). In real life, a large catch, always
the product of cooperation among many individual whalers, is meticu-
lously divided into pre-designated parts and carefully distributed among
the members of the community. 
d. Among the Aché, 79% of proposers offered either 40% or 50%, and 16%
offered more than 50%, with no rejected offers. In daily life, the Aché reg-
ularly share meat, which is being distributed equally among all other house-
holds, irrespective of which hunter made the kill. 
e. The Hadza, unlike the Aché, made low offers and had high rejection rates
in the ultimatum game. This reflects the tendency of these small-scale for-
agers to share meat, but with a high level of conflict and frequent attempts
of hunters to hide their catch from the group. 
f. Both the Machiguenga and Tsimané made low ultimatum game offers,
and there were virtually no rejections. These groups exhibit little cooper-
ation, exchange or sharing beyond the family unit. Ethnographically, both
show little fear of social sanctions and care little about «public opinion.» 
g. The Mapuche’s social relations are characterized by mutual suspicion, envy,
and fear of being envied. This pattern is consistent with the Mapuche’s
post-game interviews in the ultimatum game. Mapuche proposers rarely
claimed that their offers were influenced by fairness, but rather by a fear
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feared rare spiteful responders, who would be willing to reject even 50/50
offers.
8.2. The Public Goods Game
The public goods game has been analyzed in a series of papers by the social psy-
chologist Toshio Yamagishi (1986,1988), by the political scientist Elinor
Ostrom and her coworkers (Ostrom et al., 1992), and by economists Ernst
Fehr and his coworkers (Gächter and Fehr 1999, Fehr and Gächter 2000,
2000). These researchers uniformly found that groups exhibit a much higher
rate of cooperation than can be expected assuming the standard economic model
of the self-interested actor, and this is especially the case when subjects are given
the option of incurring a cost to themselves in order to punish free riders.
A typical public goods game consists of a number of rounds, say ten. The
subjects are told the total number of rounds, as well as all other aspects of
the game. The subjects are paid their winnings in real money at the end of the
session. In each round, each subject is grouped with several other subjects 
—say 3 others— under conditions of strict anonymity. Each subject is then
given a certain number of ‘points,’ say twenty, redeemable at the end of the
experimental session for real money. Each subject then places some fraction
of his points in a ‘common account,’ and the remainder in the subject’s ‘private
account.’ The experimenter then tells the subjects how many points were con-
tributed to the common account, and adds to the private account of each sub-
ject some fraction, say 40%, of the total amount in the common account. So
if a subject contributes his whole twenty points to the common account, each
of the four group members will receive eight points at the end of the round. In
effect, by putting the whole endowment into the common account, a player
loses twelve points but the other three group members gain in total 24 (= 8 × 3)
points. The players keep whatever is in their private account at the end of the
round.
A self-interested player will contribute nothing to the common account.
However, only a fraction of subjects in fact conform to the self-interest model.
Subjects begin by contributing on average about half of their endowment to
the public account. The level of contributions decays over the course of the
ten rounds, until in the final rounds most players are behaving in a self-inter-
ested manner (Dawes and Thaler, 1988, Ledyard, 1995). In a meta-study of
twelve public goods experiments, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) found that in the
early rounds, average and median contribution levels ranged from 40% to
60% of the endowment, but in the final period 73% of all individuals
(N=1042) contributed nothing, and many of the remaining players con-
tributed close to zero. These results are not compatible with the self-inter-
ested actor model, which predicts zero contribution on all rounds, though
they might be predicted by a reciprocal altruism model, since the chance to
reciprocate declines as the end of the experiment approaches. However this
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in the public goods game.
The explanation of the decay of cooperation offered by subjects when
debriefed after the experiment is that cooperative subjects became angry at
others who contributed less than themselves, and retaliated against free-rid-
ing low contributors in the only way available to them —by lowering their
own contributions (Andreoni, 1995).
Experimental evidence supports this interpretation. When subjects are
allowed to punish noncontributors, they do so at a cost to themselves (Dawes,
Orbell and Van de Kragt, 1986; Sato 1987; Yamagishi, 1988a,1988b,1992). For
instance, in Ostrom et al. (1992) subjects interacted for twenty-five periods
in a public goods game, and by paying a ‘fee,’ subjects could impose costs on
other subjects by ‘fining’ them. Since fining costs the individual who uses it, but
the benefits of increased compliance accrue to the group as a whole, the only
Nash equilibrium in this game that does not depend on incredible threats is
for no player to pay the fee, so no player is ever punished for defecting, and
all players defect by contributing nothing to the common pool. However, the
authors found a significant level of punishing behavior.
These studies allowed individuals to engage in strategic behavior, since
costly punishment of defectors could increase cooperation in future periods,
yielding a positive net return for the punisher. Fehr and Gächter (2000) set
up an experimental situation in which the possibility of strategic punishment was
removed. They used six and ten round public goods games with groups of size
four, and with costly punishment allowed at the end of each round, employ-
ing three different methods of assigning members to groups. There were suf-
ficient subjects to run between 10 and 18 groups simultaneously. Under the
Partner treatment, the four subjects remained in the same group for all ten
periods. Under the Stranger treatment, the subjects were randomly reassigned
after each round. Finally, under the Perfect Stranger treatment the subjects were
randomly reassigned and assured that they would never meet the same sub-
ject more than once. Subjects earned an average of about $35 for an experi-
mental session.
Fehr and Gächter (2000) performed their experiment for ten rounds with
punishment and ten rounds without4. Their results are illustrated in Figure 1.
We see that when costly punishment is permitted, cooperation does not dete-
riorate, and in the Partner game, despite strict anonymity, cooperation increas-
es almost to full cooperation, even on the final round. When punishment is
not permitted, however, the same subjects experience the deterioration of coop-
eration found in previous public goods games. The contrast in cooperation
rates between the Partner and the two Stranger treatments is worth noting,
because the strength of punishment is roughly the same across all treatments.
4. For additional experimental results and analysis, see Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Fehr
and Gächter (2002).
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Partner treatment because in this treatment the punished subjects are certain
that, once they have been punished in previous rounds, the punishing sub-
jects are in their group. The prosociality impact of strong reciprocity on coop-
eration is thus more strongly manifested, the more coherent and permanent
the group in question.
9. Conclusion
Each of the behavioral disciplines contributes strongly to human behavioral
science. Taken separately and at face value, however, they offer partial, con-
flicting, and incompatible models of human behavior. From a scientific point
of view, it is scandalous that this situation was tolerated throughout most of
the Twentieth Century. Fortunately, there is currently a strong current of uni-
fication based on both mathematical models and common methodological
principles for gathering empirical data on human behavior and human nature.
The true power of each discipline’s contribution to knowledge will only
appear when suitably qualified and deepened by the contribution of the oth-
ers. For instance, the economist’s model of rational choice behavior must be
qualified by a biological appreciation that preference consistency is the result
of strong evolutionary forces, and where such forces are absent, consistency will
Figure 1. Average Contributions over Time in the Partner, Stranger, and Perfect Stranger
Treatments when the Punishment Condition is Played First (adapted from Fehr and Gächter,
2000).
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aprioristic notions that preferences are self-regarding must be abandoned. These
are the key tenets of behavioral economics. Second, the sociologist’s notion of
internalization of norms is generally rejected by the other behavioral disciplines
because the ease with which diverse values can be internalized depends on
human nature (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, Pinker, 2002), and the rate at
which values are acquired and abandoned depends on their contribution to fit-
ness and well-being (Gintis, 2003b, Gintis, 2003a). Finally, there are often swift
society-wide value changes that cannot be accounted for by socialization the-
ory (Wrong, 1961, Gintis, 1975). When properly qualified, however, and appro-
priately related to the general theory of cultural evolution and strategic learning,
the socialization theory is considerably strengthened.
Disciplinary boundaries in the behavioral sciences have been determined his-
torically, rather than conforming to some consistent scientific logic. Perhaps
for the first time, we are in a position to rectify this situation.
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